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Abstract
In this paper I compare two different the models of two-dimensional
belief change, namely ‘revision by comparison’ (Ferme´ and Rott, Artifi-
cial Intelligence 157, 2004) and ‘bounded revision’ (Rott, in Hommage a`
Wlodek, Uppsala 2007). These revision operations are two-dimensional in
the sense that they take as arguments pairs consisting of an input sentence
and a reference sentence. Two-dimensional revision operations add a lot to
the expressive power of traditional qualitative approaches to belief revision
and refrain from assuming numbers as measures of degrees of belief.
1. Introduction
Representations of belief states in terms of probability functions or ranking
functions are very rich and powerful. However, it is often hard to come by mean-
ingful numbers. Qualitative belief change in the style of Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors
and Makinson (1985, henceforth ‘AGM’) and its extensions to iterated belief
change in the 1990s, on the other hand, are simple and do not need numbers,
but are a lot more restricted in their expressive power. Two-dimensional belief
revision attempts to strike a good balance between the advantages of AGM-style
qualitative and quantitative approaches.
1.1. Revision by comparison
Ferme´ and Rott (2004) suggested a basically qualitative approach that is more
flexible than AGM style models in that it allows a new piece of information to be
accepted in various degrees or strengths. The key idea is that an input sentence
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α does not come with a number, but does not come ‘naked’ either. It rather
comes with a reference sentence δ that typically expresses an antecedently held
belief. The agent is then supposed to follow an instruction of the form
‘Accept α with a strength that at least equals that of δ.’
Revision by comparison is a model that lies between the traditional qualitative
and quantitative approaches.1 In the context of revision by comparison, ‘revis-
ing by α’ is understood to mean revising with reference to some existing belief
expressed by the reference sentence δ.
A drawback of the revision-by-comparison approach of Ferme´ and Rott is that
it does not satisfy the Darwiche-Pearl postulates for iterated belief change (Dar-
wiche and Pearl 1997). These postulates have a very appealing possible worlds
semantics that strongly suggests that they should be satisfied by iterated revi-
sion functions (compare Section 2.2 below).
1.2. Bounded revision
Bounded revision was motivated by the same concerns as revision by compar-
ison, combined with the desire to satisfy the Darwiche-Pearl postulates (Rott
2007). Intuitively, δ serves as a bound for the acceptance of α. The reference
sentence δ functions here as a measure of how firmly entrenched α should be in
the agent’s belief state after the change.
The idea of bounded revision can be expressed more precisely by the following
recipe:
‘Accept α as long as δ holds along with α, and just a little more.’
In a way, the acceptance of α is bounded by δ. We can think of the reference
sentence δ in two ways. First, we may suppose that it is a marker delineating
the shape of a sphere in a Grovean system of spheres that characterizes the
reasoner’s initial belief state. Second, we can use δ as a sentence that is supposed
to hold in a range of relatively plausible situations in which α holds. Rott (2007)
argues that the latter option is preferable for bounded revision. One advantage
is that the second option is more general because it includes the first option as
a special case.
1An approach similar to revision by comparison was introduced earlier in Cantwell’s (1997)
‘raising’ operation. Cantwell has also presented an interesting dual operation that he calls
‘lowering’.
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Any arbitrary sentence δ may sensibly serve as the parameter sentence for a
bounded revision. The agent need not actually believe that δ is true. However,
the paradigm cases are those in which δ is cotenable with α to some extent, in
the sense that a stretch of the comparatively plausible ways of making α true
are all ways that make δ true as well.2 The greater the stretch where δ holds
along with α, the firmer α gets accepted by a revision that is bounded by δ.
Usually the intended cases of belief revision are those in which the input sen-
tence α is not believed prior to the revision. However, two-dimensional revision
may well be used to increase the strength or entrenchment of a sentence that
the agent has already believed to be true prior to the revision.3
2. Generalizing AGM to two-dimensional revisions of belief states
What is a belief state? For the purposes of this paper, belief states may be
entities of any type whatsoever, neural states, holistic mental states, abstract
machine states etc. We assume that the set of beliefs of a reasoner, but not nec-
essarily his or her whole belief state is epistemically accessible. The beliefs are,
so to speak, the visible tip of the iceberg that itself remains concealed from our
eyes and, perhaps, from the reasoner’s own eyes as well. Our hypothesis is that
belief states have a rich structure that determines at least the development of
the agent’s belief set in response to any sequence of inputs. We do not exclude
that it determines more. In Section 2.3, we shall specify concrete formal struc-
tures as representations of belief states that contain a lot more structure than
a plain belief set, but are still abstractions from ‘real’ belief states. We start
this section, however, by addressing the problem of belief change in abstraction
from any particular conceptualization of belief states.
2.1. One-dimensional and two-dimensional belief revision operators
A one-dimensional belief revision operation is a function ∗ that takes a belief
state B and an input sentence α and returns the new belief state. ∗(B, α) denotes
the state B revised by α. A two-dimensional revision function is similar, except
that the input is a pair of sentences 〈α, δ〉. The first sentence is the input
2Intuitively, not only the most plausible α-worlds, but also all those that are sufficiently
plausible are moved center stage in a bounded revision by α, and it is precisely the task of
the reference sentence δ to characterize what is meant ‘sufficient.’ Compare Fig. 1 below.
3This is the main idea underlying Cantwell’s (1997) approach.
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sentence, the second sentence the reference sentence.4 The sentences can vary
fully independently from each other, thus the name ‘two-dimensional.’5 Usually,
I will use the variables α, β and γ etc. for input sentences, and the variables δ,
ε, ζ etc. for reference sentences.
We work with a finite propositional language L. The set of possible worlds
(interpretations, models) and the set of sets of logically equivalent sentences
are then finite, too.6 We use Cn to indicate a consequence operation govern-
ing L. We suppose throughout this paper that the logic is Tarskian, that it
includes classical propositional logic, and that it satisfies the deduction theo-
rem.7 The only inconsistent and logically closed set in the language is the set
of all sentences which we also denote by L.
Notation: If Γ is a set of sentences and α and β are sentences, I shall write
Γ + α for Γ ∪ {α}. For any belief state B, pBq is the set of beliefs held by a
person in belief state B (more exactly: the beliefs that can be ascribed to the
person, or the beliefs that the person is committed to). We assume that pBq
is logically closed. If B and B′ are two belief states, then B ' B′ is short for
pBq = pB′q. As is common in theories of one-dimensional revision functions ∗,
we write B ∗ α for ∗(B, α). For a two-dimensional revision function ∗, we write
B ∗δ α for ∗(B, 〈α, δ〉).
The main benchmark in theory change are the famous AGM postulates for
one-step belief revision (AGM 1985). We rewrite them in a new notation that
makes explicit that belief revision, (i), is really about the revision of belief states
rather than belief sets and, (ii), is more generally conceived as two-dimensional
rather than one-dimensional.
4The terminology of input and reference sentences is taken over from Ferme´ and Rott
(2004).
5The overused epithet ‘two-dimensional’ is certainly not ideal. Unfortunately, all the
friendly suggestions of colleagues (thank you!) seem to have other drawbacks, so I stick
to my name as long as no better one springs to mind.
6We presuppose finiteness mainly as a matter of convenience, in order not to burden this
paper with technical details distracting us from the main issues. An infinite language would
not complicate things as long as we work with entrenchment relations, but when working with
systems of spheres, infinity complicates the matter enormously. See, e.g., Pagnucco and Rott
(1999, Section 8).
7By saying that the logic Cn is Tarskian, we mean that it is reflexive (Γ ⊆ Cn (Γ)),
monotonic (if Γ ⊆ Γ′, then Cn(Γ) ⊆ Cn(Γ′)), idempotent (Cn(Cn(Γ)) ⊆ Cn(Γ)) and compact
(if α ∈ Cn(Γ), then α ∈ Cn(Γ′) for some finite Γ′ ⊆ Γ). The deduction theorem says that
α→β ∈ Cn(Γ) if and only if β ∈ Cn(Γ ∪ {α}). We may write Γ ` α for α ∈ Cn (Γ).
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(AGM1) pB ∗δ αq is logically closed.
(AGM2) pB ∗δ αq contains α
(AGM3) pB ∗δ αq is a subset of Cn (pBq+ α)
(AGM4) If α is consistent with pBq, then pBq is a subset of pB ∗δ αq
(AGM5) If α is consistent, then pB ∗δ αq is consistent
(AGM6) If α is logically equivalent with β, then pB ∗δ αq = pB ∗δ βq
(AGM7) pB ∗δ (α ∧ β)q is a subset of Cn (pB ∗δ αq+ β)
(AGM8) If β is consistent with pB∗δαq, then pB∗δαq is a subset of pB∗δ(α∧β)q
To get the AGM postulates for one-dimensional revision operations, just drop
the subscript ‘δ’ from each occurrence of ‘∗δ’.
It follows from (AGM3) and (AGM4) that if pBq is consistent, then pBq =
pB ∗δ >q for any δ. The beliefs in a consistent belief state B are exactly the
same beliefs as after the revision of B by the tautology >, regardless of which
reference sentence δ is given.
From the point of view of the present paper, (AGM5) introduces an unnec-
essary loss of generality.8 An agent may consider more sentences than just
logical falsehoods as ‘absolutely impossible’. And a revision by an absolutely
impossible sentence may lead him or her either into an inconsistent belief set
(the AGM idea) or into a refusal to change anything (an alternative idea which
makes equally good sense).
It is natural to assume that two-dimensional revision functions satisfy the AGM
postulates, except for (AGM5). But as we shall soon see, revision by comparison
is an operation that does not satisfy them. The reason is that it has features
of belief contraction (belief withdrawal, removal, subtraction, etc.) as well as
belief revision. This does not hold for bounded revision which is thus more
well-behaved or simpler in this respect.
(AGM6)–(AGM8) compare revisions by two different input sentences. It seems
absolutely unproblematic to validly strengthen each of these postulates by re-
placing the last occurrence of ‘δ’ by a logically equivalent reference sentence ‘ε’.
A more interesting and more important question relevant for two-dimensional
belief change is whether it is legitimate to vary the reference sentence attached
to ‘∗’ within a single postulate, and use an arbitrary, not necessarily equivalent
8Recommendations how to weaken (AGM5) in a one-dimensional context are given in Rott
(2001, pp. 149–153, 206 and 118).
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sentence ‘ε’ in the place of the second occurrence of ‘δ’. This seems plausible
insofar as we can assume that the reference sentence only specifies the strength
with which the input sentence is accepted, but not the content of the new belief
set. In other words, insofar as the beliefs obtained after a revision by an input
sentence α do not depend on the reference sentence δ at all. A central condition
to be discussed is this:
(SBC) pB ∗δ αq = pB ∗ε αq for all δ and ε
Let us call this condition the Same Beliefs Condition. It says that the posterior
belief set does not depend on the reference sentence. If (SBC) is satisfied, only
the structure of the belief state obtained is sensitive to variations of the reference
sentence. We shall see that bounded revision satisfies (SBC), but revision by
comparison in general does not. In the latter model, the relative strengths of
input and reference sentence do matter, which is again due to the fact that
revision by comparison is not a pure operation of revision but has features of
contraction, too. Restricted versions of (SBC), however, will turn out to hold
for revision by comparison as well.
2.2. Iterations
Now we turn to the Darwiche-Pearl postulates for iterated belief change that
were already mentioned in the introduction. We adapt them here so as to apply
to the general case of two-dimensional revision functions.
(DP1) If β implies α, then (B ∗δ α) ∗ε β ' B ∗ζ β
(DP2) If β is inconsistent with α, then (B ∗δ α) ∗ε β ' B ∗ζ β
(DP3) If α is in pB ∗ζ βq, then α is in p(B ∗δ α) ∗ε βq
(DP4) If ¬α is not in pB ∗ζ βq, then ¬α is not in p(B ∗δ α) ∗ε βq
A much more cautious formulation would take the same reference sentence ‘δ’
everywhere rather than varying the reference sentences within each condition. It
remains to be seen how various two-dimensional revision operations fare with
respect to the more cautious and the bolder formulations of (DP1)–(DP4).
The two approaches considered in this paper are clear cases anyhow: Bounded
revision satisfies, but revision by comparison does not satisfy the Darwiche-
Pearl postulates.
Since these postulates concern iterations, they make statements not only about
belief sets, but implicitly also about one-step changes of belief states as well.
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As Darwiche and Pearl (1997) have shown, (the one-dimensional counterparts
of) these postulates correspond one by one to very appealing semantic condi-
tions in terms of a total preordering of possible worlds (graphically representable
as a Grovean system of spheres.9 Assume that a belief state is represented by
such a preordering and that the new piece of information is α. Then (DP1)
and (DP2) essentially say that a revision by α should preserve the preorder-
ing restricted to the α-worlds and the preordering restricted to the ¬α-worlds,
respectively. (DP3) and (DP4) taken together essentially say that the relative
position of an α-world with respect to a ¬α-world must not be worse after a re-
vision of the belief state by α. This eminently plausible semantics recommends
that the Darwiche-Pearl postulates be obeyed by reasonable iterated belief re-
vision operators, and in fact it can be shown that an important class of iterated
revision functions obey them, amongst them bounded revision (Rott 2007).
2.3. Representing belief states as order relations
In what sense do equations like the above characterize an iterated revision
function for belief states? How can we get from B and an input of the form α
or 〈α, β〉 to the revised belief state? A key to understanding much of traditional
research in belief revision is that the belief sets obtained after potential second
revision steps give sufficient evidence about the belief state the agent is in after
the first revision step.
We will work with two different forms of representation of belief states that are
sufficient to determine the set of beliefs held after any sequence of inputs.10 The
first is a total pre-ordering of possible worlds. Such preorderings can equiva-
lently be presented graphically in the form of Grovean systems of spheres (s.o.s.)
of possible worlds (Grove 1988). This is by far the most easily comprehensible
representation. For this paper, we assume that an s.o.s. $ is a non-empty, finite
set of sets of possible worlds such that for any two sets S and S′ in $, either
S ⊆ S′ or S′ ⊆ S (that is, the elements of $ are ‘nested’, or form a chain
with respect to ⊆). Intuitively, the most plausible worlds are contained in the
smallest (graphically, ‘innermost’) sphere of $, the second most plausible worlds
are contained in the second smallest sphere, and so on. Worlds not contained
in any sphere are called inaccessible in $. The set of sentences true at all the
worlds contained in the innermost sphere express the beliefs held true by an
9Grove (1988). More on this in Section 2.3.
10There is a third representation in terms of prioritized belief bases which is particularly
attractive for the operation of revision by comparison; cf. Rott (forthcoming).
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agent in belief state $; this is the agent’s belief set and denoted by p$q.
Our second way of representing a belief state is by a total ordering ≤ of sen-
tences, usually called ‘entrenchment relation’ (Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson (1988),
Rott (2001, 2003a)). Such an ordering can roughly be thought of as reflecting
the degree of belief or the comparative retractability of the respective sentences.
These degrees are required to respect logical structure in two ways. First, if α
implies β, then the entrenchment of α cannot be higher as that of β (‘domi-
nance’). Second, the conjunction α ∧ β is not less entrenched than the weaker
of α and β (‘conjunctiveness’). In the first respect entrenchments behave like
probabilities, in the second, they are quite different. The set of sentences that
are more than minimally entrenched are the beliefs held true by an agent in
belief state ≤; this is the agent’s belief set and denoted by p≤q.11
What does it mean to say that a system of spheres or an entrenchment ordering
represents a belief state? This is not a trivial question. As we said before,
a formal structure like an s.o.s. $ or an entrenchment relation ≤ is still an
abstraction from a ‘real’ belief state. And what the real belief state is may be
inscrutable to us. But we can say that $ or ≤ represents a belief state if it
reproduces just that aspect of belief states we may hope to have access to, i.e.,
the development of the agent’s beliefs. The structures $ and ≤ should encode
all the information necessary to derive the resulting belief sets for all iterated
belief changes, provided that a specific method of using $ and ≤ to construct
a single revision step is given. For instance, in one-dimensional belief revision
this means that for systems of spheres
p(((B ∗ α) ∗ β) ∗ γ) ∗ . . .q = p((($∗α)∗β)∗γ)∗ . . .q
and in two-dimensional belief revision
p(((B ∗δ α) ∗ε β) ∗ζ γ) ∗ . . .q = p((($∗α,δ)∗β,ε)∗γ,ζ)∗ . . .q
for all finite sequences of inputs 〈α, β, γ, . . .〉 or 〈〈α, δ〉, 〈β, ε〉, 〈γ, ζ〉, . . .〉, respec-
tively. The definition for entrenchment relations is similar.
It is well-known from the belief revision literature beginning with AGM that an
ordering representation of a belief state B determines a one-dimensional revision
function specifying, for each potential input sentence α, the belief set that
results from revising B by α. Conversely, given such a one-dimensional revision
11We assume in this paper that the entrenchment relation is non-trivial in the sense that >
is more entrenched than ⊥.
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function satisfying certain ‘rationality postulates’, one can (re-)construct an
ordering that can be taken to underlie that revision function.12
For the connection between systems of spheres and revised belief sets13, we can
make use of the following transitions (see Grove 1988):
(From $ to p∗q) β is in pB∗αq if and only if there is a sphere in $ containing
some α-worlds which are all β-worlds, or there is no sphere
containing any α-worlds.
(From p∗q to $) A set S of possible worlds is in $ if and only if there is a
sentence α such that S = {w ∈ W : for some β, w satisfies
all sentences in pB ∗ (α ∨ β)q}.
For the connection between entrenchments and revised belief sets, we can use
the following transitions (see Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson 1988, Rott 2001, Ch. 8):
(From ≤ to p∗q) β is in pB ∗ αq if and only if ¬α < α→β or > ≤ ¬α.
(From p∗q to ≤) α ≤ β if and only if α is not in pB ∗ ¬(α ∧ β)q
or pB ∗ ¬(α ∧ β)q is inconsistent.
There is a certain asymmetry in the intuitive plausibilities of these recipes. For
system of spheres, the construction of ∗ in terms of $ is more transparent then
the (re-)construction of $ from ∗. But for entrenchments, the (re-)construction
of ≤ from ∗ is more convincing than the construction of ∗ in terms of ≤. Because
the two directions fit together perfectly, for systems of spheres as well as for
entrenchment relations, both modellings are almost universally accepted in the
one-dimensional setting.
Additional support comes from the result that the s.o.s. modelling and the
entrenchment modelling are equivalent in quite a strong sense. One can easily
complete the circle of equivalences, by defining an entrenchment relation from
an s.o.s. and an s.o.s. from an entrenchment relation, that are equivalent in
the sense that they generate exactly the same revision function. The relevant
transitions are (see, for instance, Pagnucco and Rott 1999):
(From $ to ≤) α ≤ β if and only if for all S in $, if α is true throughout S,
then β is true throughout S as well.
12The additional information encoded in two-dimensional belief change operations is not
needed for the (re-)construction of the belief state.
13Note that the following connections, as well as the corresponding ones connecting revised
belief sets and entrenchments, do not appeal to the belief states.
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(From ≤ to $) A non-empty set S of possible worlds is in $ if and only if
there is a sentence α such that S = {w ∈W : w satisfies all
sentences β with α ≤ β}.14
As long as there is no danger of confusion, we will allow ourselves to say that
an s.o.s. or an entrenchment relation is a belief state rather than saying that it
is an abstraction from, or a representation of, a belief state.
3. Bounded revision
Bounded revision is a change operation the non-iterated part of which is fully
taken care of by the AGM postulates (with the above-mentioned exception of
AGM5). So we can immediately address the problem of iterations.
3.1. Bounded revision as an operation for iterated belief change
The general iteration condition for the two-dimensional operation of bounded
revision is this:
(ITb)
B ∗δ α ∗ε β '
{
B ∗ζ (α ∧ β) if pB ∗δ (α ∧ (δ→β))q is consistent with β
B ∗ζ β otherwise
Unfortunately, this condition is not very transparent. The rationale for it will
become clear when we turn to the modellings in terms of systems of spheres
and entrenchments.
Look at what the condition of bounded revision gives for the important special
case β = >. We obtain, after a little simplification using (AGM6),
B ∗δ α ∗ε > '
{
B ∗ζ α if pB ∗δ αq is consistent
B ∗ζ > otherwise
If pB ∗δ αq is consistent, the left hand side equals pB ∗δ αq, by (AGM3) and
(AGM4). Therefore, (ITb) implies that if pB ∗δ αq is consistent, it is identical
with pB ∗ζ αq for any reference sentence ζ. By a symmetrical argument applied
pB∗ζαq, it also follows that if pB∗δαq is inconsistent so is pB∗ζαq. In sum, then,
bounded revision satisfies the Same Beliefs Condition (SBC). Knowing this, we
14I neglect the problem of adding the empty set to systems of spheres. Cf. footnote ??.
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will drop the subscripts to ‘∗’ in this section when we are only interested in the
belief state resulting from bounded revision.
We consider two limiting cases of reference sentences δ that are (i) never or (ii)
always cotenable with α. The operations of conservative revision and moder-
ate revision15 can be obtained from bounded revision by fixing the parameter
sentence as ⊥ (falsity) and > (truth), respectively. Both conservative and
moderate revision, however, seem to be defective. Conservative revision accepts
new evidence, but always accords the lowest possible entrenchment to it, so that
it gets immediately lost if a contradiction with another piece of evidence arises
(see Rott 2003b). Moderate revision in a way suffers from the opposite defect
by accepting the new information very firmly. While conservative revision is
too conservative, moderate revision seems too radical. Bounded revision covers
the range between these two extremes.
For the first limiting case, let δ be ⊥ (or equivalently, let δ be ¬α). Then (ITb)
reduces to
B ∗⊥ α ∗ β '
{
B ∗ (α ∧ β) if pB ∗ αq is consistent with β
B ∗ β otherwise
which characterizes conservative revision. The upper line follows already from
the AGM postulates (AGM7) and (AGM8) for one-step revisions.
For the second limiting case, let δ be > (or equivalently, let δ be α). Then,
given the AGM postulates minus (AGM5), (ITb) reduces to
B ∗> α ∗ β '
{
B ∗ (α ∧ β) if pB ∗ (α ∧ β)q is consistent
B ∗ β otherwise
which characterizes moderate revision. Had we also accepted the consistency
postulate (AGM5), the upper line could be made conditional on the simple
requirement that α ∧ β be consistent.
The revision operation specified by the AGM axioms (except (AGM5)) and the
iteration axiom ITb) satisfies the Darwiche-Pearl postulates. This can either
be proved directly on the level of the postulates, or by considering the s.o.s.
15These are my names (Rott 2003b). The operations I denote by these names are more
well-known as natural revision as introduced by Boutilier (1993) and lexicographic revision as
studied by Nayak (1994) and others, respectively.
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semantics of bounded revision presented in the next section.16
3.2. Bounded revision as an operation on systems of spheres
In Section 2.3, we have seen that given the revised belief sets pB ∗ αq for all
potential inputs α, one can reconstruct an ordering representation of the belief
state B. This throws new light on the equation (ITb) for iterated belief change
from Section 3.1. Given the revised belief sets p(B ∗δ α) ∗ βq for all potential
inputs β, one can similarly reconstruct an ordering representation of the belief
state B ∗δ α. That is to say that (ITb) in effect specifies a transition from a
representation of the belief state B to a representation of the belief state B∗δ α.
Bounded revision functions should thus be viewed as functions applying to
formal representations of belief states (not only on belief sets which contain
too little information, and not on belief states which may ultimately be in-
scrutable). In this and the next subsection, we give a direct account of the
relevant transitions, as applying on systems of spheres and entrenchment rela-
tions respectively. We begin with the representation of belief states in terms of
systems of spheres.
Let [α] denote the sets of possible worlds in which α is true. Let α intersect $,
i.e., let there be at least one sphere in $ that has a non-empty intersection with
[α]. Let Sα,δ be the smallest sphere S in $ such that S ∩ [α] 6⊆ [δ]; if there is no
such sphere, take Sα,δ to be the largest sphere in $.
Let $∗α,δ denote the system of spheres that results from revising the prior s.o.s.
$ by an input sentence α, bounded by reference sentence δ. The following
definition of bounded revision as an operation on systems of spheres applies to
the case in which α intersects $.
(BoundRevSS)
$∗α,δ = {S ∩ [α] : S ∈ $, S ∩ [α] 6= ∅ and S ⊆ Sα,δ} ∪ {S ∪ ([α] ∩ Sα,δ) : S ∈ $}
If α does not intersect $, then we simply put $∗α,δ = $ ∪ {∅}. We assume
that once a world is inaccessible, it cannot be made accessible by a revision
operation.17
16A formulation of the systems of spheres semantics for the Darwiche-Pearl postulates is
given in Rott (2007).
17This question is particularly relevant for ‘moderate’ belief change.
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Figure 1 shows what happens to an s.o.s. when it gets revised by bounded
revision. The numbers used in this figure are, of course, just there to indicate
the relative plausibilities of (regions of) possible worlds. ‘1’ designates the most
plausible worlds, ‘2’ the second most plausible worlds, and so on. ‘∞’ designates
the doxastically impossible or inaccessible worlds.
4 5
76
3
2
1
8 9
9
¥
¥
[a]
[d]
Fig. 1: Bounded revision: Moving the best α ∧ δ-worlds (and a few
more α-worlds) to the center, preserving all distinctions
The picture brings out the fact that bounded revision tends to increase the num-
ber of spheres in an s.o.s. (in the example from 6 to 9), thus making plausibility
distinctions finer.
Now let us have a look at the limiting cases for (BoundRevSS).18 If δ is ⊥ (or
¬α), then Sα,δ is the smallest sphere S in $ such that S ∩ [α] 6= ∅; let us denote
this sphere by Sα. Then we get conservative revision:
$∗α,⊥ = {Sα ∩ [α]} ∪ {S ∪ (Sα ∩ [α]) : S ∈ $}
If δ is > (or α), then Sα,δ is the largest sphere S in $; let us denote this sphere
by Smax. Then we get moderate revision:
$∗α,> = {S ∩ [α] : S ∈ $ and S ∩ [α] 6= ∅} ∪ {S ∪ (Smax ∩ [α]) : S ∈ $}
Assuming that belief states can be represented by systems of spheres, we get
the following characterization theorem:
18I neglect the case of an impossible α now.
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Observation 1. (i) The two-dimensional revision function ∗ determined by
(BoundRevSS) satisfies (AGM1)–(AGM8) and (ITb).
(ii) If the two-dimensional revision function ∗ satisfies (AGM1)–(AGM8) and
(ITb), then there is, for each iterated revision process determined by ∗, a system
of spheres $ such that at each state in this process, the set of beliefs accepted
is identical with the set of beliefs determined by the corresponding system of
spheres as transformed according to (BoundRevSS):
pB ∗δ αq = p$∗α,δq
p(B ∗δ α) ∗ε βq = p($∗α,δ)∗β,εq
p((B ∗δ α) ∗ε β) ∗ζ γq = p(($∗α,δ)∗β,ε)∗γ,ζq
. . . and so on.
The proof of this observation has to be supplied elsewhere.
3.3. Bounded revision as an operation on entrenchment relations
We now turn to the direct account of transitions from representations of B
to representations of B ∗ α in terms of entrenchment relations. Bounded re-
vision thus becomes an iterable revision operation operating on entrenchment
relations.
Let ≤∗α,δ denote the entrenchment relation that results from revising the prior
entrenchment relation ≤ by an input sentence α, bounded by reference sentence
δ. The definition of bounded revision as an operation on entrenchment relations
applies (at least) for cases in which ¬α is less entrenched than the tautology
>.19 Here is the ordering, defined by comparing any two sentences β and γ:
(BoundRevEnt)
β ≤∗α,δ γ iff

α→β ≤ α→γ , if α→(β ∧ γ) ≤ α→δ
and α→(β ∧ γ) < >
β ≤ γ , otherwise
It can be proved that (BoundRevEnt) leads from entrenchment relations to
19If, on the other hand, > ≤ ¬α, then (the lower line of) the following condition rules
that the entrenchment relation should not change at all. In order to satisfy the ‘success’
condition (AGM2) when α is impossible, we would have to stipulate that in this case p≤q be
the inconsistent set {φ : ⊥ ≤ φ}.
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entrenchment relations, i.e. transitive relations that satisfy dominance and
conjunctiveness.20
With (BoundRevEnt), we get the posterior ordering δ <∗α,δ α, that is δ ≤∗α,δ α
and not α ≤∗α,δ δ. But α surpasses δ after the revision only to the slightest
possible degree: There is no sentence φ for which δ <∗α,δ φ <
∗
α,δ α. Thus one
could say that (BoundRevEnt) defines some kind of ‘revision by comparison’,
in that it implements a reasonable way of minimally accepting the condition
δ < α.
As mentioned before, we can allow arbitrary sentences to take the role of δ, but
then of course δ cannot be interpreted as specifying a degree of belief relative
to the current belief state (characterized by ≤). In fact δ need not even be
a belief at all in this interpretation. Limiting cases are again obtained when
the reference sentence is a logical falsehood or a logical truth. If δ is ⊥ then
(BoundRevEnt) reduces to
β ≤∗α,⊥ γ iff
{
α→β ≤ α→γ if α→(β ∧ γ) ≤ ¬α and α→(β ∧ γ) < >
β ≤ γ otherwise
which is the entrenchment recipe for conservative revision.21 If δ is > then
(BoundRevEnt) reduces to
β ≤∗α,> γ iff
{
α→β ≤ α→γ if α→(β ∧ γ) < >
β ≤ γ otherwise
which is the entrenchment recipe for moderate revision.22
Assuming that belief states can be represented by entrenchment relations, we
get the following characterization theorem:
Observation 2. (i) The two-dimensional revision function ∗ determined by
(BoundRevEnt) satisfies (AGM1)–(AGM8) and (ITb).
20(BoundRevEnt) violates the success condition (AGM2) if > ≤ ¬α and we use the usual
definition of p≤∗α,δ q. The belief set associated with any non-trivial entrenchment relation is
consistent. If we insist that a revision by an ‘impossible’ input results in the inconsistent belief
set, we need to redefine p≤∗α,δ q = {β : ⊥ ≤∗α,δ β} in such a case.
21As usual in the AGM paradigm, α→(β ∧ γ) ≤ ¬α means β ∧ γ /∈ K ∗α. If this condition
is satisfied then α→β ≤ α→γ reduces to α→β ≤ ¬α.
22Had we presumed that only logical truths get top entrenchment (an assumption corre-
sponding to (AGM5)), then α→(β ∧ γ) < > had meant the same as β ∧ γ /∈ Cn (α).
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(ii) If the two-dimensional revision function ∗ satisfies (AGM1)–(AGM8) and
(ITb), then there is, for each iterated revision process determined by ∗, an
entrenchment relation ≤ such that at each state in this process, the set of beliefs
accepted is identical with the set of beliefs determined by the corresponding
entrenchment relation as transformed according to (BoundRevEnt):
pB ∗δ αq = p≤∗α,δq
p(B ∗δ α) ∗ε βq = p(≤∗α,δ)∗β,εq
p((B ∗δ α) ∗ε β) ∗ζ γq = p((≤∗α,δ)∗β,ε)∗γ,ζq
. . . and so on.
The proof of this observation has to be supplied elsewhere.
3.4. Bounded revision as an operation on prioritized data bases
Space does not permit us to explain how the shifting of priorities in a prioritized
data base
−→
h = h1 ≺ . . . ≺ hn works. For this, the reader is referred to Rott
(forthcoming). We reproduce the transition instruction here just in order to
convey an idea of the complexity involved.
(BoundRevPDB)
−→
h 7−→ −→h ≺ . α ≺ . −−−−−−−−→h≤(α→δ) ∨ α ≺ .
−−−−→
h>(α→δ)
4. Revision by comparison
‘Revision by comparison’ is the name of the second existing kind of two-dimen-
sional belief change that we consider in this paper. Ferme´ and Rott (2004)
present a gentle introduction into the intuitive ideas and formal properties of
revision by comparison. Here is their set of axioms for the case of one-step (i.e.,
non-iterated) revision.
(C1) pB ∗δ αq is logically closed
(C2) If α is logically equivalent with β and δ is logically equivalent with
ε, then B ∗δ α ' B ∗ε β
(C3) If ε is not in pB ∗δ ⊥q, then pB ∗δ ⊥q is a subset of pB ∗ε ⊥q
(C4) If δ is in pB ∗δ ⊥q, then δ is in every pB ∗ε αq
(C5) If δ is in pB ∗δ∧¬α ⊥q, then pB ∗δ αq = Cn (pB ∗δ∧¬α ⊥q+ α)
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(C5) If δ is not in pB ∗δ∧¬α ⊥q, then pB ∗δ αq = pB ∗δ∧¬α ⊥q
Revision by comparison does not satisfy all the AGM axioms, but a certain
variation of that set. The following conditions are theorems following from
(C1)–(C6).23
(AGM1) pB ∗δ αq is logically closed.
(AGMc2) pB ∗δ αq contains α, if it contains δ.
(AGM3) pB ∗δ αq is a subset of Cn (pBq+ α)
(AGM4) If α is consistent with pBq, then pBq is a subset of pB ∗δ αq
(AGMc5) pB ∗δ αq is inconsistent iff ¬α, δ ∈ pB ∗ε βq for all ε and β
(AGM6) If α is logically equivalent with β, then B ∗δ α ' B ∗δ β
(AGM7) pB ∗δ (α ∧ β)q is a subset of Cn (pB ∗δ αq+ β)
(AGM8) If β is consistent with pB ∗δ αq, then pB ∗δ αq is a subset of
pB ∗δ (α ∧ β)q
(AGM7&8) B ∗δ (α ∨ β) ' B ∗δ α or B ∗δ (α ∨ β) ' B ∗δ β or
pB ∗δ (α ∨ β)q = pB ∗δ αq ∩ pB ∗δ βq
The restricted success condition (AGMc2) is a lot weaker than the unconditional
AGM success condition (AGM2). If the negation of the input sentence is at
least as entrenched as the reference sentence, then the latter gets lost rather
than the input accepted. (AGMc5) is different from the corresponding AGM
postulate in that it is an ‘iff’ rather than an ‘if’ condition, and it allows that
a consistent input may lead to an inconsistent belief set, but only if both the
input’s negation and the reference sentence are irrevocable. Two further very
strong conditions for varying reference sentences are satisfied in revision by
comparison (Ferme´ and Rott 2004, Obs. 6):
(AGM−c8) If δ /∈ pB ∗δ∧ε αq, then pB ∗δ∧ε αq = pB ∗δ αq
(AGM−cD) pB ∗δ∧ε αq = pB ∗δ αq or pB ∗δ∧ε αq = pB ∗ε αq
Now we ask whether revision by comparison satisfies the Same beliefs condition
(SBC). It is clear from the discussion of Ferme´ and Rott (2004) that it does not.
If the reference sentence δ is strong enough, i.e., if it is more entrenched than
the negation ¬α of the input sentence α, then revision by comparison yields
an AGM revision of the initial belief set. If, however, the reference sentence is
23In (AGM3) and (AGM4), as well as in Observation 3 below, conditions (i) and (ii), B is
identified with B ∗⊥ ⊥. For an explanation, see Rott and Ferme´ (2004, p. 19).
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weaker, than it gets lost, and what we get is not a successful revision by α but
a severe withdrawal (Pagnucco and Rott 1999) of the reference sentence δ.
Is it possible to characterize special cases in which (SBC) holds for revision
by comparison? Although the building blocks were present in Ferme´ and Rott
(2004), they did not address the problem head-on. So we supply the following
Observation 3. Revision by comparison satisfies the following conditions.
(i) If α is in pBq and pBq is consistent, then B ∗δ α ' B.
(ii) If δ is not in pBq, then B ∗δ α ' B.
(iii) B ∗δ > ' B.
(iv) If α is in pB ∗δ αq and pBq is consistent, then B ∗δ α ' B ∗> α
(v) If α is in both pB ∗δ αq and pB ∗ε αq, then B ∗δ α ' B ∗ε α (SBCc1)
(vi) If α is not in pB ∗δ αq, then B ∗δ α ' B ∗δ ⊥
(vii) If α is neither in pB ∗δ αq nor in pB ∗ε αq, then pB ∗δ αq is a subset or
a superset of pB ∗ε αq
(viii) If neither δ nor ε is in pB ∗δ∧ε ⊥q, then B ∗δ α ' B ∗ε α (SBCc2)
The proof of Observation 3 is to be found in the appendix. Here are some
comments. (i) is a vacuity condition for the input sentence, (ii) a vacuity
condition for the reference sentence.24 (iii) says that revising by a tautology
does not change the belief set. (iv) tells us that as far as the belief sets are
concerned, any successful revision by α gives the same result as an ‘irrevocable
revision’ by α. (v) is a Same Belief Condition restricted to successful revisions
by α; we call it (SBCc1). (vi) tells us that as far as the belief sets are concerned,
any unsuccessful revision by α give us the same result as a ‘severe withdrawal’ of
the reference sentence δ. (vii) states that all belief sets reached by unsuccessful
revisions by α are related by subset inclusion. (viii) is a Same Belief Condition
restricted to revisions with reference sentences of equal entrenchment. This
restriction is expressed by the antecedent of condition (viii) which we also call
(SBCc2).
4.1. Revision by comparison as an operation for iterated belief change
The general condition for the two-dimensional operation of revision by compar-
ison is quite complicated (Ferme´ and Rott 2004):
24Condition (ii), but not condition (i) could even be strengthened to an identity of belief
states rather than only of the belief sets.
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(ITc)
p(B ∗δ α) ∗ε ⊥q =

Cn (pB ◦α→ε ⊥q+ α) if pB ∗ε ⊥q 6= L
and δ ∈ pB ◦δ (α ∧ ¬ε)q
pB ∗δ ⊥q ∩ pB ∗ε ⊥q if pB ∗ε ⊥q 6= L
and δ /∈ pB ∗δ (α ∧ ¬ε)q
L if pB ∗ε ⊥q = L
There are a number of simple derived properties for iteration that are satisfied
by revision by comparison.
(ITc1) (B ∗δ α) ∗δ β ' B ∗δ (α ∧ β)
(ITc2) (B ∗δ α) ∗ε α '
{
B ∗δ α , if ε /∈ pB ∗δ ⊥q or pB ∗δ ⊥q = L
B ∗ε α , otherwise
(ITc3) (B ∗δ α) ∗ε α ' (B ∗ε α) ∗δ α
(ITc4) p(B ∗δ⊥) ∗ε⊥q =
{
pB ∗δ ⊥q ∩ pB ∗ε ⊥q , if pB ∗δ ⊥q, pB ∗ε ⊥q 6= L
L , otherwise
(ITc5) (B ∗δ α) ∗α δ '
{
B ∗α δ , if δ /∈ pB ∗α ⊥q or pB ∗α ⊥q = L
B ∗δ α , otherwise
Ferme´ and Rott (2004) provided an inelegant axiomatization, but no elegant
axiomatization of iterated revision by comparison is known yet. In particular,
it is not clear whether (ITc1)–(ITc5) jointly sufficient to derive (ITc) and thus
to characterize the iteration part of revision by comparison.
4.2. Revision by comparison as an operation on systems of spheres
Here the general questions are quite similar to those of Section 3.2. The partic-
ular s.o.s. semantics spelt out in Ferme´ and Rott is described by the following
equation:
(RevCompSS)
$∗α,δ = {S ∩ [α] : S ∈ $, S ∩ [α] 6= ∅ and S ⊆ [δ]} ∪ {S : S ∈ $ and S 6⊆ [δ]}
Figure 2 shows what happens to an s.o.s. when it gets revised by revision by
comparison.
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Fig. 2: Revision by comparison: Moving the best ¬α ∧ δ-worlds to
the closest ¬δ-permitting sphere, deleting all distinctions
The picture brings out the fact that revision by comparison tends to decrease
the number of spheres in an s.o.s. (in the example from 6 to 4), thus making
plausibility distinctions coarser. This contrasts with bounded revision that
tends to increase the number of spheres and thus introduces finer plausibility
distinctions. In a way, the two methods seem to complement each other.
A result analogous to Observation 3.2 holds true, but has not been proved
anywhere so far. We refer the reader to the equivalent modelling in terms of
entrenchment relations (see the next section).
4.3. Revision by comparison as an operation on entrenchment relations
The preliminaries for this section are similar to Section 3.3. The corresponding
result for revision by comparison is this:
(RevCompEnt)
β ≤∗α,δ γ iff
{
δ ∧ (α→β) ≤ (α→γ) , if β ≤ δ
β ≤ γ , otherwise
Results analogous to Observation 2 have been provided by Ferme´ and Rott
(2004, Theorems 10–13).
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4.4. Revision by comparison as an operation on prioritized data bases
As in the case of bounded revision, we refrain from explaining any details here
(Rott forthcoming). We must be content with an impression of the complexity
of the operation. Revision by comparison transforms a prioritized data base−→
h = h1 ≺ . . . ≺ hn into the following one:
(RevCompPDB)
−→
h 7−→ −−→h<δ ≺ . h=δ ∧ α ≺ .
−−→
h>δ
This is a surprisingly simple recipe. The input sentence α is inserted at the
highest level in the prioritized data base at which the reference sentence is
derivable.
5. Conclusion
We have discussed two two-dimensional operations of belief revision that ‘lie
between’ quantitative and qualitative approaches in that they do not use num-
bers and are still able to specify the extent or degree to which a new piece of
information is to be accepted. They do so by specifying a reference sentence
with the idea that the input has to be accepted as long as the reference sen-
tence holds along with the input sentence (and just a little further than that),
or alternatively, at least as strongly as the reference sentence. In both senses,
the acceptance of the input sentence may be said to be delimited by the range
or the strength of the reference sentence.
The models compared are bounded revision as introduced in Rott (2007) and
revision by comparison as studied by Cantwell (1997) and Ferme´ and Rott
(2004).25 Despite their principal similarities, these models exhibit a number of
important differences, differences that make for a quite different Gestalt. We
list eight features in roughly decreasing order of significance.
(1) Bounded revision is successful in the sense that the input sentence always
gets accepted, independently of which reference sentence is used. Revision by
comparison, in contrast, is successful only in the severely restricted form of
(AGMc2). If the reference sentence is not more entrenched than the negation
25Cantwell uses the term ‘raising’ and contrasts it with yet another two-dimensional oper-
ation he calls ‘lowering’.
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of the input sentence, then the former gets lost rather than the latter gets
accepted.
(2) Bounded revision satisfies the Same Beliefs Condition (SBC) uncondition-
ally, while revision by comparison satisfies it only provided that either the re-
vision is ‘successful’ or the strength of the index sentence is invariant ((SBCc1)
and (SBCc2)). The explanation for both (1) and (2) is, of course, that in
contrast to bounded revision, revision by comparison embodies not only an
operation of belief revision, but also an operation of belief contraction.26
(3) Both models fill out a whole space of possibilities between interesting one-
dimensional belief change functions as limiting cases. But these limiting cases
are quite different. Taking a logical truth as the reference sentence gives irrevo-
cable revision (see Segerberg 1998 and Rott 2006) for revision by comparison,
while it gives moderate revision for bounded revision. Taking a logical falsity
as the reference sentence generates conservative revision for bounded revision,
but does not produce any change for revision by comparison. Fixing a logi-
cal falsity as the input sentence produces a severe withdrawal of the reference
sentence in revision by comparison, but does not produce any changes in the
orderings representing the belief state.27
(4) Bounded revision satisfies the Darwiche-Pearl postulates. In contrast, re-
vision by comparison violates these postulates, since it wipes out relevant dis-
tinctions between worlds in which the input sentence is false and the reference
sentence is true.
(5) While bounded revision tends to refine orderings of possible worlds and
beliefs (the number of spheres in the agent’s s.o.s. and the number of layers
in her entrenchment relation increase), revision by comparison has just the
opposite effect and tends to coarsen orderings of possible worlds and beliefs
(the number of spheres and entrenchment layers decreases).
(6) While bounded revision follows basically an as-long-as strategy (‘accept α
as long as δ holds along with it’), revision by comparison opts for an at-least-as
strategy (‘accept α as least as strongly as δ’).
26In more precise terminology: an operation of severe withdrawal (Pagnucco and Rott 1999).
27In terms of systems of spheres, revising by an inconsistency according to (BoundRevSS)
only adds the empty sphere as the new innermost sphere and thus generates an inconsistent
belief set(but no change in the corresponding ordering of possible worlds). In terms of en-
trenchments, revising by an inconsistency according to (BoundRevEnt) introduces no change
in the ordering of sentences.
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(7) In bounded revision, the input sentence is believed in the posterior belief
state just a little more strongly than the reference sentence, it is believed at
least as strongly as the reference sentence in revision by comparison.
(8) Various presentations of the two operations give quite different views of
their complexity. The iteration axiom (ITb) for bounded revision is simple,
but the iteration axiom (ITc) for revision by comparison looks terribly compli-
cated.28 On the other hand, the presentation of revision by comparison in terms
of changes of prioritized data bases is very simple, while the one of bounded
revision is fairly complex.
There is a whole list of questions concerning further methods of two-dimensional
belief change. Is it possible to use bounded revision with an at-least-as strat-
egy?29 Can we use it with a posterior of ‘δ ≤ α’ in the place of ‘δ < α’? Can we
equip bounded revision with an integrated contraction mechanism? Or, what
may amount to the same thing, can we retain the idea of revision by compari-
son and at the same time satisfy the Darwiche-Pearl postulates? Is it possible
to combine revision by comparison with an as-long-as strategy? Question such
as these indicate the richness contained in the idea of two-dimensional belief
revision. Last but not least, we should not forget to mention that in the very
first paper (I think) presenting the idea of two-dimensional belief change, John
Cantwell (1997) introduced a method of ‘lowering’ that we have not covered
at all in this paper. I am sure that many interesting discoveries can be made
about a great diversity of two-dimensional belief change operations.
The eight factors listed above are certainly not independent of each other. But
taken together they show that bounded revision and revision by comparison
are complements in various interesting ways. Bounded revision and revision
by comparison are two implementations of a single very general idea, that of
renouncing the use of numbers and working with reference sentences in their
place, thus interpreting belief change as a sort of doxastic preference change with
inputs of the form ‘δ ≤ α’ or ‘δ < α’. There are some good reasons why just
these two operations were chosen as objects of study, but they are definitely
not the only reasonable ways to go two-dimensional. Going two-dimensional
gives a lot of new leeway for approaches that refrain from assuming meaningful
numbers as measuring degrees of belief. I hope to have indicated that one can
work without numbers and advance to more elaborate forms of reasoning than
28As mentioned above, it is possible that (ITc) can be replaced by one or more simple
iteration axioms.
29The answer to this question is ‘yes.’
23
the one reported by Gordon (2004).30 This paper is meant as an invitation
to cooperate and explore a rich diversity of possibilities in two-dimensional
belief change. As research in belief revision progresses, an increasing number
of potentially rational methods for revising one’s belief states emerges. What
we will need in order to apply these promising models in practice is a general
methodology telling us when to apply which operations of belief change.
Appendix: Proof of Observation 3
Most of the properties listed in Observation 3 are immediate from the semantics
of revision by comparison as given in Ferme´ and Rott. The proofs from the first
principles (C1)–(C6) are more tedious, but still they are instructive. We will
freely use the properties (Q1)–(Q16) from Ferme´ and Rott (2004, Obs. 7).
(i) Let α be in pBq. Then, by (AGM3), pB ∗δ αq ⊆ Cn (pBq+ α) = pBq. Since
α ∈ pBq 6= L, α is consistent with pBq. So, by (AGM4), pBq ⊆ pB ∗δ αq. In
sum thus B ∗δ α ' B.
(ii) is Lemma 5 of Ferme´ and Rott (2004).
(iii) By (C5) and (C6), pB ∗δ>q is either Cn (pB ∗δ∧¬>⊥q+>) or pB ∗δ∧¬>⊥q,
which both reduces to pB ∗⊥ ⊥q. Since B is identified with B ∗⊥ ⊥, we get that
B ' B ∗⊥ ⊥ ' B ∗δ >.
(iv) Let α ∈ pB ∗δ αq. Then, by (Q11), either δ ∈ pB ∗δ αq or α ∈ pB ∗δ ¬αq. If
the former is true, we conclude with (Q10) directly that B∗δα ' B∗>α, and we
are done. So suppose the latter is true. From this, together with α ∈ pB ∗δ αq,
we can derive with the help of (AGM7&8) that α ∈ pB ∗δ (α∨¬α)q from which
we get, by (C2), α ∈ pB ∗δ >q. Thus, by (iii), α ∈ pBq, so since pBq is assumed
to be consistent, we can use (i) and conclude that B ∗δ α ' pBq ' B ∗> α, as
desired.
(v) follows from (iv).
(vi) Suppose that α /∈ pB ∗δ αq. Then by axioms (C5) and (C6) B ∗δ α '
B ∗δ∧¬α ⊥. Also by (AGMc2) δ /∈ pB ∗δ αq. So δ /∈ pB ∗δ∧¬α ⊥q and by axiom
(C3) pB ∗δ∧¬α ⊥q ⊆ pB ∗δ ⊥q. On the other hand, from δ /∈ pB ∗δ αq we also
get, by axiom (C4), δ /∈ pB ∗δ ⊥q. From this, property (Q16) gives pB ∗δ ⊥q ⊆
30Other cognitive activities without numerals and numbers are discussed by Field (1980)
and Hellman (1989).
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pB∗δ∧¬α⊥q. Taking the two inclusions together, we get B∗δ⊥ ' B∗δ∧¬α⊥. But
we already know that B ∗δ α ' B ∗δ∧¬α⊥, and finally arrive at B ∗δ α ' B ∗δ ⊥,
as desired.
(vii) Suppose that α is neither in pB ∗δ αq nor in pB ∗ε αq. Then we know
from (vi) that B ∗δ α ' B ∗δ ⊥ and B ∗ε α ' B ∗ε ⊥. We distinguish two cases.
First, suppose that δ /∈ pB ∗ε ⊥q. Then, by (C3), pB ∗ε ⊥q ⊂ pB ∗δ ⊥q, and we
are done. So suppose, second, that δ ∈ pB ∗ε ⊥q. If also δ ∈ pB ∗δ ⊥q, then
pB∗δ⊥q = L, by Lemma 0(d) of Ferme´ and Rott (2004), and pB∗ε⊥q ⊆ pB∗δ⊥q
again. If, on the other hand, δ /∈ pB ∗δ ⊥q, then, using (Q1), we immediately
get pB ∗δ ⊥q ⊆ pB ∗ε ⊥q, and we are done as well.
(viii) As a preparatory lemma, we show that for all δ and ε,
(+) Either pB ∗δ ⊥q ⊆ pB ∗ε ⊥q or pB ∗ε ⊥q ⊆ pB ∗δ ⊥q.
(+) is immediate if either pB ∗δ⊥q or pB ∗ε⊥q in inconsistent. So suppose that
neither is inconsistent. By (Q16), we then have both pB ∗δ ⊥q ⊆ pB ∗δ∧ε ⊥q
and pB ∗ε ⊥q ⊆ pB ∗δ∧ε ⊥q. From this, (+) follows immediately with the help
of (AGM−cD).
Suppose as the general hypothesis that neither δ nor ε is in pB ∗δ∧ε ⊥q. Then,
by (AGM−c8), we get B ∗δ ⊥ ' B ∗δ∧ε ⊥ ' B ∗ε ⊥. Suppose first that ¬α ∈
pB ∗¬α ⊥q. Then we prove that the claim B ∗δ α ' B ∗ε α is equivalent with
B ∗δ ⊥ ' B ∗ε⊥ which we have just shown. Let ¬α ∈ pB ∗¬α⊥q. By (C4) then,
¬α ∈ pB ∗δ αq 6= L, so α /∈ pB ∗δ αq and by (AGM8) pB ∗δ αq ⊆ pB ∗δ ⊥q. On
the other hand, we have δ /∈ pB ∗δ ⊥q, so by (Q17), pB ∗δ ⊥q ⊆ pB ∗δ αq. Taken
together, we get pB ∗δ αq = pB ∗δ ⊥q, which is what we needed.
So suppose second that ¬α /∈ pB∗¬α⊥q. We address (viii) by a case distinction
that is complete, by (+).
Case 1: pB ∗¬α ⊥q ⊆ pB ∗δ ⊥q. By (AGM−cD) and (Q16), we get B ∗δ∧¬α ⊥ '
B ∗δ ⊥. Since δ /∈ pB ∗δ ⊥q, we get from (C6) that B ∗δ α ' B ∗δ∧¬α⊥ ' B ∗δ ⊥.
Since we know from the hypothesis that B ∗ε ⊥ ' B ∗δ ⊥, we get from the
assumption of Case 1 that pB ∗¬α ⊥q ⊆ pB ∗ε ⊥q. Then by reasoning in a
completely analogous manner as before, we get B ∗ε α ' B ∗ε∧¬α ⊥ ' B ∗ε ⊥.
Using the transitivity of ' to wrap things up, we finally arrive at B∗δα ' B∗εα,
as desired.
Case 2: pB ∗δ ⊥q ⊂ pB ∗¬α ⊥q. From this it follows that pB ∗¬α ⊥q 6⊆ pB ∗δ ⊥q,
and so by (C3), δ ∈ pB ∗¬α ⊥q. On the other hand, from the assumption that
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pB∗δ⊥q ⊆ pB∗¬α⊥q, we get by (AGM−cD) and (Q16) that B∗δ∧¬α⊥ ' B∗¬α⊥.
Thus δ ∈ pB ∗δ∧¬α ⊥q, and so by (C5), we get that pB ∗δ αq = Cn (pB ∗δ∧¬α
⊥q+ α) = Cn (pB ∗¬α ⊥q+ α) = pB ∗> αq, by (C5) again. Since we know from
the hypothesis that B∗ε⊥ ' B∗δ⊥, we get from the assumption of Case 2 that
pB ∗ε⊥q ⊂ pB ∗¬α⊥q. Then by reasoning in a completely analogous manner as
before, we get pB∗εαq = Cn (pB∗ε∧¬α⊥q+α) = Cn (pB∗¬α⊥q+α) = pB∗>αq.
In sum, we get again B ∗δ α ' B ∗ε α, as desired. This completes the proof of
(viii). QED
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